This paper explores the changing nature of North/South relations in contemporary climate change governance. Focusing on the United Nations Collaborative Programme to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDDþ), the paper presents a theoretical framework, through which stakeholder perceptions of REDDþ governance quality and institutional legitimacy can be evaluated. This is tested by means of a small-n survey of state and non-state participants from both the developed and developing countries, including the Asia-Pacific region. The survey results reveal generally higher ratings for REDDþ amongst Southern participants than in the North. A number of caveats are placed on the interpretation of data, and some conclusions drawn regarding contemporary climate governance and the emergence of a possible 'South/North Divide', challenging traditional notions of global power politics.
Introduction
While it is fair to say that the sharp contrast between developed and developing countries in climate negotiations has blurred in recent times, and that geo-political alliances in the South have become fragmented post-Copenhagen, it is still too early to dismiss the North/South divide as no longer relevant. As the authors will argue, the arrival of one of the most significant and emerging post-Kyoto replacements, the United Nations Collaborative Programme to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, now referred to as REDDþ, has generated a new range of governance dynamics around which different stakeholder interests are converging. The aim of this paper is to explore these changing circumstances, through a historical analysis and investigation into recent developments in contemporary climate governance, focusing on REDDþ and the attitudes of participating stakeholders from the developing countries (or the global South), and the developed countries (or the global North).
The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) played an important normative role in shaping the general response to the environmental crisis, bringing market-based approaches as a method of environmental problem solving to the fore (Arts 2006) . Another positive outcome, and enshrined in substantive document of the event, Agenda 21, was the recognition given to the participation of non-state interests, particularly non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the framework of international environmental policy and environmental decision making at all levels (United Nations 1993). The historical precedents set by Rio have engendered a conceptual evolution away from talking almost exclusively about government (''control exercised by the nation-state, through formal (usually elected) parties'') towards governance (''control exercised by a variety of public and private institutions that have been established at different spatial scales'') (Perrons 2004, p. 255) . Climate governance reflects the growing preference for social-political forms of stakeholder interaction, with decentralised networks made up of multiple actors functioning at multi-levels, and including NGOs and the private sector (Haas 2002, Juhola and Westerhoff 2011) . This has implications for the nature of relations between state, society and the economy, and for previous notions of legitimacy (Bulkeley 2010) . Non-state actors, previously outside the formal decisionmaking arenas, now play a role in the formation of public policy, albeit from the sidelines, and their participation is challenging traditional conceptions of power and authority. The Kyoto Protocol in particular has opened up climate change to market mechanisms, creating governance structures which require co-operation between state and non-state actors, although nation-states ultimately endorse them (Andonova et al. 2009 ).
However, Rio was not without its conflicts. Over the course of the conference discussions broke down into two distinct camps, with the global South arguing that industrialised, largely Northern, countries were seeking to externalise the costs of the environmental problems they had first created onto developing states (Birnie 2000) . In the climate governance arena, it has been contended that the more powerful the country, the greater influence they have on international policy positions that best suit themselves (Okereke 2010) . Indeed, the North/South Divide has been identified as one of the contributing factors to an almost complete institutional ossification of the climate change regime (Depledge 2008) . This has led to the governance of climate change being characterised as a classic example of arrested development (Young 2010) . It might be easiest to respond by simply agreeing that the relations between the developed and developing country participants in climate change negotiations continue to be reinforced by historical divisions. However, the conventional North/ South analysis appears to be shifting. Interestingly, it is around the Kyoto Protocol's three market-based 'flexibility' mechanisms, the international emissions trading (IET), joint implementation (JI) and most notably, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) where there has been the most significant meeting of developed and developing country minds, and as will be demonstrated below, in REDDþ. The CDM in particular has allowed Northern investment in mitigation projects in developing countries and the purchase of associated emissions to 'offset' domestic emissions. These mechanisms, initially opposed by northern NGOs, the European Union and the South, have nevertheless had the effect of encouraging negotiation and co-operation between developing and developing countries, since much of the implementation occurs in the South, whilst the North reaps the benefits by offsetting its emissions (Mejı´a 2010) . The fact that these reductions can be purchased at a lower cost than via domestic action has made the CDM economically efficient and attractive method of tackling climate change (Ba¨ckstrand and Lo¨vbrand 2007) .
Consequently, a more revisionist analysis separates North/South relations into three distinct phases over the life of climate negotiations to date. The first is portrayed as consisting of a formal, institutionalised divide through the designation of Convention participants as being either Annex I Parties, i.e. developed countries, or Non-Annex I Parties. The second stage was largely dominated by internal NorthNorth struggles between various alliances either in support of, or reluctant to ratify, the Kyoto Protocol and implement market mechanisms. The third, current, period is one of increasing North-South co-operation around Kyoto implementation. This more contemporary period is nevertheless also commensurate with a fragmentation of Southern interests, culminating in the Copenhagen Accord of 2010. It was at this point in the negotiations that the least developed countries and small island states were separated from the other developing countries, which were required to put in place mandatory climate mitigation measures (Mejı´a 2010) .
China has played a significant role in shifting developing countries' positioning over whom should take responsibility for global emissions. In the post-Copenhagen environment it has emerged as the foremost challenger to the negotiating hegemony of the US (Mejı´a 2010) . It should also be noted that China has been a major beneficiary of the CDM. An examination of uptake demonstrates that as at 2006, 67% of the total registered CDM projects were in Brazil (8%), India (23%) and China (36%) (Kedia et al. 2006) . By 2008 this had risen to 12%, 40% and 59%, respectively (Dechezlepreˆtre et al. 2009 ). As of 3 August 2011, 3340 CDM projects have been registered in 71 developing countries and these projects are anticipated to generate more than 2030 million tCO 2 e by the end of 2012 (UNFCCC, 2011) (see Figure 1 and Table 1 ).
In the case of India, initial opposition towards the trading of emissions has shifted to reflect acceptance of its merits (Depledge 2008) . It is also worth noting that it is the emergent bloc of BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) have been identified as playing a contributory role in the Southern post-Copenhagen fragmentation (Mejı´a 2010 , Hallding et al. 2011 . Researchers have identified a gap in existing knowledge and have called for more a detailed understanding of relations between the issues and interests at play in the governance of climate policy, particularly in terms of North/South dynamics (Bumpus and Cole 2010) . It is worth pointing out in this regard that despite the disagreements at Copenhagen, discussions regarding the ongoing development of REDDþ continued relatively unaffected and Parties did not break down into negotiating blocs around the initiative (Mejı´a 2010) . This makes REDDþ particularly interesting from a governance perspective, and would appear to reinforce a contention amongst researchers that forest governance provides the ideal locality in which to scrutinise ''the increasing tendency for collaboration in many sectors where political and economic trade-offs also exist'' (Overdevest 2004, p. 192) .
REDDþ origins, architecture and governance challenges
The original idea of providing payments in exchange for actively preserving forests as part of a market-based trading system, and thus reducing emissions from deforestation (RED), has been accredited to Columbia University MBA graduate Kevin Conrad. By the time the Kyoto Protocol was formally ratified in 2004 deforestation had effectively dropped off the agenda. Conrad, founder of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations representing the main rainforest regions, successfully lobbied the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to consider his proposal as a mechanism for re-integrating action on deforestation back into the climate change talks (Kwon 2006) . Both the Stern and IPCC reports of 2007 demonstrated that deforestation contributes approximately 18% of anthropogenic CO 2 emissions. These provided an intellectual rationale for the decision at the Bali Conference of the Parties (COP)-13 in the same year to consider measures to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). In September 2008, the UN-REDD Programme was launched to support reduction-related strategies at the national level (Rosendal and Andresen 2011) .
A survey of REDD activities undertaken in 2009 identified 100 REDD demonstration activities and nearly 80 REDD readiness activities (Cerbu et al. 2011) . Demonstration activities refer to actions put in place in a given sub-national region or forest management unit, such as a national park, aimed at reducing deforestation or forest degradation in that given locality. REDD readiness activities have higher, national-level objectives, usually around capacity building, policy (Cerbu et al. 2011 ).
In the wake of COP-15 in Copenhagen, the initiative was altered to 'REDDþ' to reflect the initiative's growing emphasis on conserving and enhancing forests on the basis of their value for carbon sequestration, rather than simply reducing emissions (Parker et al. 2010 ).
This shift in terminology signified a stronger commitment, albeit without guarantee, that the co-benefits of protecting both livelihoods and biodiversity should be on an equal level with carbon uptake and storage (Rosendal and Andresen 2011) . It is not yet certain if REDDþ incentives in the future will be funded via multilateral development banks or bilateral measures, or whether they will be linked to carbon markets and involvement from the private sector or through hybrid combinations of public finance and market-driven REDDþ 'credits' (Reed 2010, cited in Corbera and Schroeder 2011) . The uncertainty regarding the development of a genuinely global carbon market post-COP-15 may also have the negative impact of constraining private investment, despite the enthusiasm for REDDþ at Copenhagen (Corbera et al. 2010) .
Although there is a strong, economic rationale to use market-based or at least market-linked instruments in this policy field, experience with the CDM shows that carbon governance is a dynamic policy arena. An important question for REDDþ is whether structural and procedural aspects will be given sufficient weight so that as meaningful participation of stakeholders as possible takes place (Lederer 2011) . Here, the expectation -from the perspective of NGOs, at least -is that the mechanism becomes part of the solution to climate change and not part of the problem. REDDþ consequently requires governance systems that are capable of addressing governance realities on the ground (Global Witness 2009). There is a danger that the fiduciary and participatory discourses within REDDþ may come into conflict. Environmental and social NGOs are particularly wary of the potential for funding to subvert safeguards for Indigenous peoples and good governance. This is particularly the case regarding the implementation of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), which, as a consequence of the Copenhagen Accord, will now also be undertaken by developing countries, and funded by developed countries. At COP-16 in Cancun the provisions regarding NAMAs were agreed to by the Parties separately from, but linked to, REDDþ negotiations, leading NGOs to speculate that this might generate ''perverse and contradictory outcomes'' (ECA 2011, p. 2).
The success of REDDþ as an international mechanism will further depend on the existence of governance arrangements that are also able to deliver both emission reductions at scale (i.e. solve the problem), as well as being transparent, and inclusive. Global decision-making processes will need to include methods that engage representatives of a range of non-state interests, including forest dependent peoples, civil society organisations, and the private sector. So far, advance negotiation texts have included references to the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, even if there is still a need for greater clarity around issues such as tenure, and ownership of forest carbon (Lyster 2011) . REDDþ, and its recognition of forest peoples' rights, has the potential to improve climate governance more broadly (Anon 2010) . Decision making also needs to be equitable, and cater for a range of needs, both relating to communities most at risk from climate change, as well as broader concerned communities (Barnett 2010) . If projects can be designed to build on the lessons learned from previous tropical forest conservation and development initiatives, it may be able to advance climate and forest governance in ways that previous mechanisms have not (Blom et al. 2010) . The governance arrangements necessary for REDDþ to meet such expectations are discussed in the next section.
Theoretical approach to assessing the governance dimensions of international environmental policy
Concerns about REDDþ often centre upon gaps in legitimacy, and not just specific institutional or technical aspects, particularly amongst developing country stakeholders (Streck et al. 2010) .
Legitimacy is a core analytical problem for governance scholars but its study is still in its infancy (Biermann et al. 2009, Biermann and Gupta 2011) . Two theories currently dominate. Legitimacy can be 'input oriented'; that is, derived from the consent of those being asked to agree to the rules, and concerning such procedural issues as the democratic arrangements underpinning a given system. Legitimacy can also be 'output oriented'; derived from the efficiency of rules, or criteria for 'good' governance, and demonstrated by substantive outcomes (Scharpf 1997 , cited in Kjaer 2004 . Lederer (2011) has argued that output-oriented legitimacy/effectiveness can be achieved in REDDþ but that a higher degree of input-oriented legitimacy is also necessary for REDDþ, which may require a tradeoff between the two forms of legitimacy. The best way to enable this alignment is to examine how stakeholder involvement is facilitated in REDDþ processes -both in terms of the extent to which participation is as unconstrained as possible, and the degree to which the real concerns and needs of these communities are voiced within deliberations as programmes and projects move forward. It is only through significant interaction that stakeholder interests can be aligned from the local community level, to international negotiations .
Unless significant attention is paid to such matters REDDþ will simply be another contribution to an ongoing of narrative of maginalisation of vulnerable stakeholders by development and conservation projects . This has resulted in the recognition that more research is needed, which explores the governance quality of REDDþ Schroeder 2011, Thompson et al. 2011) . A second, equally important and related observation is that greater attention should be paid to evaluating the success of climate change policies on the basis of the social processes, which drive decision making (Barnett 2010) . This is all the more pressing in view of the fact that governance, as opposed to government, is increasingly acknowledged as a primary means by which social and political interaction can be understood in the global context of state, society, the environment, and the market. This perspective is predicated on recognising the significance of:
Social-political governing processes (and structures), that take both interactions and actors seriously. Interactions shape actors and actors shape interactions as well. They are 'equal' as basic units of analysis and theory development. (Kooiman 2000, p. 163) This is an important observation, since it grounds theory and practice within the normative assumption that structures and processes are fundamental to Figure 2 implies that inputs and outputs are both related to legitimacy. Structural and procedural inputs such as participation and deliberation are only of value in so far as they deliver results; otherwise they can engender 'decoy' institutions, created for the purposes of appearing to deliver results, whilst not actually doing anything (Dimitrov 2006) .
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On the other hand, there is little point to an institution that delivers results, but either ignores or overrides the discussions of participants. In this case collaboration and due process will have been sacrificed, and there is unlikely to be very much long-term ownership and implementation of the outcomes generated (Cadman 2011b ).
Where they exist, studies attempting to evaluate governance quality tend to focus on a range of institutional attributes, as the brief review above has demonstrated. The term 'governance arrangement' is generally used to refer to a range of specific mechanisms influencing ''the interaction between various actors pursuing common goals'' (Koenig-Archibugi 2006, p. 24). These institutional arrangements, identified across the fields of governance theory, have a bearing on governance quality. The problem with these studies is that the attributes chosen are arbitrary, limited in number, and not logically related to each other, reflecting rather the specific objectives of the research, than the whole suite of arrangements necessary for quality of governance. The current focus on accountability and transparency is a good example. Recent work on global governance and forest management addresses these criticisms through the development of an analytical framework around two core features of governance arrangements: structure and process, and elaborated as 'participation as structure and 'deliberations process'. The structural features focus on which actors are viewed as valid participants. In contrast, process requirements focus on the means employed to reach decisions and implement them. Two principles have been created to emphasise those normative values underpinning participation and deliberation: participation is expected to be meaningful (i.e. that involvement is genuine rather tokenistic); deliberation is expected to be productive (i.e. that discussion and dialogue is fruitful and actually delivers outputs, that can be acted upon). Based on this division between structure as participation and process as deliberation, the meaning of these two principles is elaborated by developing criteria and indicators to examine the degree to which they are achieved in a given institutional policy context (Cadman 2011a) . Principles and criteria are not usually capable of being measured directly either, but are formulated to provide a determination on the degree of compliance. They are consequently linked to indicators, which are hierarchically lower, and which represent quantitative or qualitative parameters, and do describe conditions indicative of the state of the governance system as they relate to the relevant criterion. The intention behind the placement of these attributes within such a framework is to ensure that they are located at the right level, to allow for a top-down analysis of principles via criteria and subsequently to indicators. Consistency in this context relates to the correct location within the framework; it is important that elements are placed at the appropriate level and do not overlap or duplicate those at another, and are linked back to the appropriate parameter at a higher level (Lammerts van Bueren and Blom 1997) .
It should be noted that the key governance concept of legitimacy, identified by many scholars, is not directly included, as it is understood as the end point of activity within the institution. Here, it is determined by the degree of successful interaction between the governance system's structural and procedural components, i.e. an integrating model, as depicted in Figure 1 . Input and output legitimacy are reconciled here. The normative concept being stressed is that the ends and means are equally important (even if they are not always evenly treated in reality). Both are related and consequential one to another and both play a role in legitimacy. By measuring performance at the indicator level it is possible to ascertain the level of fulfillment at the criterion and principle levels, and ultimately develop an institutional legitimacy rating. The framework is set out in Table 2 .
Method
This paper adopts the viewpoint that studyingstakeholders' perceptions from both developed and developing countries to the evolving governance of REDDþ provides insights into both the governance quality of the initiative, and the views of specific geo-political and sectoral participants. International and national level stakeholders associated with REDDþ were asked to rate the governance performance of the initiative, using a Likert scale from 'very low' to 'very high' (1-5), on the basis of their own perspectives, by means of an online survey. Each survey was 'static', i.e. collected over a set period of time (one month). By comparing the results with previous surveys it has been possible to undertake 'cuts' into REDDþ over time, to track changes in perceptions regarding governance arrangements, and observe shifting attitudes amongst participating stakeholder sectors. The questions, linked to their relevant indicators, are set out in Table 3 . The results presented here focus first on the perspectives of environmental and governmental respondents from both developed and developing countries, referred to in the survey as global North and global South, with respondents identifying themselves with one or other of these localities. Participants were recruited variously from publicly available Internet lists of organisational representatives active in the REDDþ negotiations, workshop participants or otherwise named as being associated with REDDþ. The invitation to participate in the survey was blind carbon copied to recipients, who were encouraged to disseminate the survey further. Due to anonymity provisions only the researchers had access to the individual email addresses collected, and knowledge of the specific lists used.
The surveys were conducted in November 2009, March 2010 and September 2010. Respondents were asked to identify themselves as 'environmental', 'social', and 'economic' (to capture non-state interests associated with sustainable development), as well as 'government', 'secretariat or other institutional component' (to capture any REDDþ administrative staff associated with the initiative), and 'other'. Respondents were also asked to identify themselves in geo-political terms, i.e. 'global North' and 'global South'. Environmental stakeholders identified were from a range of international and national environmental NGOs. Social stakeholders Respondents were not targeted directly on the basis of their particular affiliations, however, but were asked to self-identify the sector and region to which they felt they belonged. 'Other' was therefore also made available as a choice, and included natural resource management organisations, and groups with what they perceived to be both an environmental and social mandate. These demographics are included in Table 4 . For confidentiality reasons, individual organisations and countries cannot be named, but it is possible to disclose that respondents came from Africa, North and South America, the Asia Pacific region, and Europe. The scores of the relevant indicators were added to determine performance at the criterion level. In turn, the relevant criteria were added to determine performance at the principle level; finally, the two principle scores were combined to determine overall performance. In order to compare perceptions, respondents were stratified into four sub-groups: (1) environment North; (2) environment South; (3) government North and (4) government South. Using standard statistical methods, the average ratings of each of the four sub-groups were in turn used to calculate the weighted averages for the two main groups (environment and government). In order to ascertain the overall perceptions of all respondents, combined weighted averages were subsequently also evaluated and compared.
It should also be noted that survey respondents were not necessarily replicated across surveys. Stakeholders were also encouraged to circulate the survey to their colleagues. The anonymity guarantee, whilst encouraging responses, made it difficult to determine the consistency of individual respondents across surveys. As an online survey, stakeholders with no email address, and no access to the Internet, were excluded from responding. Respondents may be the more privileged and wellresourced stakeholders, especially in developing countries. Finally, it should be noted that in some cases the number of respondents does not constitute a representative sample of stakeholders. A greater number of respondents across sectors and regions in future surveys would help verify the sample size. Table 5 below is a breakdown of responses from environmental and government respondents, North and South. Table 6 contains the ratings of all respondents, North and South. Table 7 provides the results from Survey 3 as they pertain to respondents active in the Asia Pacific region, including both Northern and Southern actors (bearing in mind that developed country interests are associated with various countries and projects in developing nations). As Table 4 indicates, not all sectors and regions responded consistently. Economic, social and secretariat respondents are either low or absent. Second, while some sectors may have responded, representation by North/South regions is also incomplete. Third, overall numbers of participants for some sectors and regions are low. However, it should be noted that environmental and government respondents responded consistently across sectors and regions (although government/South is not present in the Asia-Pacific 
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Agreement sub-set of Survey 3). A case could be made for viewing these two sectors as constituting the two 'poles' along a non-state/state governance continuum (Jordan et al. 2005) . To a certain extent, these two sets of interest are representative of state/non-state perspectives regarding the governance quality of REDDþ. In view of the discussions above regarding the changing dynamics in NorthSouth relations, perhaps the most interesting features of the three surveys is the generally higher ratings for REDDþ governance quality given by respondents from the global South in comparison to their counterparts in the global North in both Tables 5 and 6; in Table 6 the difference is pronounced. For the Asia-Pacific region the results in Table 7 appear to be reversed. The absence of Southern governmental respondents does not allow for a balanced comparison between regions, although this is partly offset by economic participation in the survey. A further point of interest is the increase in the overall rating provided by respondents regarding the perceived legitimacy of REDDþ over time. The rise between Survey 1 and Survey 2 would appear to reflect historical events. Whilst other negotiations were not overwhelmingly successful, REDDþ discussions at COP-15 were relatively productive. On another matter, the similarity between the combined ratings for REDDþ in Table 5 (government and environmental respondents, North and South) and those in Table 6 (all respondents, North and South) is very close. This would seem to lend some credence to the view that in circumstances where other stakeholders are less responsive, environmental and government respondents represent useful surrogates for evaluating the state/non-state perspective regarding the quality and legitimacy of global environmental governance.
It is particularly interesting to note the scores given to REDDþ by environmental and governmental stakeholders in both the North and South. It is often assumed that environmental and governmental stakeholders are diametrically opposed to each other's perspectives in climate negotiations; environmental NGOs often demand tougher action, whilst governments deliver less than is often hoped for. Although there is a discrepancy between the scores accorded to REDDþ by these sectors, there is a general correspondence in overall perceptions; where Northern governments rate REDDþ lower than their Southern counterparts, so too do environmental respondents. Southern governments and environmental NGOs also have a gap in their rating, but again, there are correspondingly higher results across both sectors. In this regard, it seems that the nature of the perceptions of REDDþ governance quality of Northern and Southern governments and their NGO opposites is one of convergence of opinion rather than divergence. The difference is to be found in the degree of confidence in REDDþ. It might be expected to see governments' views converge with governments, and the same for NGOs, but once again, geo-political factors seems to come into play, rather than sectoral affiliation.
On an indicator level, most results hover somewhere in the 'medium-high' band, although this varies somewhat on the particular stakeholder. What stands out is the rising score for inclusiveness across stakeholder sectors, which would appear to indicate a growing level of responsiveness within the mechanism to the varied interests seeking to influence REDDþ development. The next highest indicators for behaviour change, problem solving and durability, also demonstrate a degree of confidence in the future ability of REDDþ to make a positive contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The low scoring indicators (resources, agreement, dispute settlement) should be a cause for concern. The provision of resources, whether they provide economic, technical or structural support for participation, are fundamental to the development of policy capable of resolving ecological problems effectively (Ja¨nicke 1992, cited in Mason 1999) . There was also a general low score for dispute settlement. This is a universal problem in global environmental agreements. Without existing institutional arrangements being changed in favour of more productive interaction, global environmental negotiations will continue to produce inadequate results (Susskind 2004) . Dispute-resolution mechanisms are essential for handling conflict and complaints when they occur around common pool resources, when problems arise that can only be solved by collective action (Ostrom 1990) . Two of the most significant contributors to governance failure are the inability to resolve conflicts, and the breakdown of engagement and negotiation processes (Stoker 2000) . It is significant that while individual sectors may rate specific indicators more or less generously, there is a high degree of convergence of views -including the Asia Pacific -on the strongest and weakest indicators. Combined with the similarities in views amongst environmental and governmental respondents in the North, and their opposites in the Southdegrees of confidence notwithstanding -there is a case to be made for arguing that these results are representative of stakeholder opinions regarding REDDþ. If this is the case, the results presented here constitute a good starting point for institutional improvements, which both target the weakest indicators, and address the concerns of the least satisfied stakeholders.
Concluding comments
As the introductory discussions above have indicated, the international climate regime has been criticised for its bias against the South, which, it is argued, results in systemic injustice. It is further asserted that this bias is entrenched by the economic imperatives which are well-established in the neo-liberal, market-based approach to problem solving. Concerns have been raised that the North, by the use of such instruments, is seeking to avoid its historic responsibility as a major emitter of greenhouse gasses. The legitimacy of global climate governance has also been challenged on account of its lack of participation and inclusiveness as well as its nontransparent decision making. This viewpoint has been challenged, and the analysis in this paper confirms a change in historical North/South relations, even if the inherently neo-liberal market-based agenda remains. In a sense, REDDþ facilitates a co-incidence of developed and developing country self-interest; the North can offset its emissions, and undertake sustainable development in the South at the same time. As an initiative 'to' the South, 'from' the North, REDDþ consequently appears to contradict the previously orthodox North/South Divide discussed in the literature, by which the North generally benefits at the expense of the South.
The results of the survey provide some interesting anecdotal information on stakeholders' attitudes to the governance of climate change. Firstly, there appears to be a fairly clear divide amongst respondents along geo-political lines. It may be drawing too long a bow to speak of an emerging 'South/North Divide', but the higher ratings from both environmental and government respondents from the South is intriguing. It appears that Northern respondents are more disaffected with REDDþ than those from the South. Whether this reflects Northern donor country pessimism, in contrast to the optimism of developing countries -who are after all set to benefit financially from REDDþ in a potentially major way -is a matter of speculation. A tentative conclusion is that REDDþ has created a novel institutional imperative for maintaining the differences between the two geo-political regions, whilst simultaneously altering -and challenging -traditional power dynamics. Clearly, there is room for further research, to see if the trends identified here are more broadly representative of stakeholder perceptions across the REDDþ community. Whatever the explanation underlying respondents' perceptions, their views on REDDþ governance quality, are certainly important. The low scoring indicators across sectors and regions should especially encourage REDDþ institutions and stakeholders to pay greater attention to governance quality in the future. In terms of international negotiations and actual implementation by countries and other interested parties, it is not sufficient to include language in negotiating texts regarding transparency or inclusiveness, for example, without actually looking at making substantive institutional improvements to existing governance arrangements at all levels. REDDþ has the potential to become one of the most significant examples of global environmental governance to emerge out of the climate negotiations. It is certainly already one of the most complex. Bearing this in mind, a governance focus is not esoteric, but essential.
